Well. Maybe the Americans were too influenced by the Germans who were busy emulating in many ways, including doctrine. I don't think the Germans fully understood what the Soviets were doing either.
Everybody was knowing what is being done and why, the releases were diffrent.
When we read articles from RAND, CSBA, DoD, or that CIA handbooks,
declassified ones under FOIA (especially these post 2005), we can see real analyst work - with pros and cons of every piece of the hardware or doctrine.
BUT when we take to the hand the paper mashe from Osprey, signed by no one else than Steven Zaloga or other "elaborates" with strangly pseudo- "miltary" titles (sigend by people of renown, like Metaxas [yes, that general]) and written by someone like Lester Grau, we can learn very "curious" things about "operational schizophrenia", "not fighting the war tactically", "soviet thinking" constricting freedom and will (that one was about Russians using artillery tables) and Marxist-Lenninist compartmentalisation of knowledge (that one was about evils of segregating knowledge about the operational area, enemy, population and associated paraphrenalia - apparently Grau thinks knowledge about climate and road network and political composition of society is of no use for real, modern warfighting force).
Nowadays, most of the real publications are devoid of such things, but you can find some oddities (like statements about failure of Russia in Ukraine becouse they have not conquerd the whole country for example, which shows us how such "writers" have neither brain nor any knowledge about what actual goals were there*).
* Given in universities and academies, universally every country not possesing Western style ideal democracy is analysed in the context of irrational behauviour, usually, even in war games, it is assumed that such actor will not behave rationally, taking into account such things, like geopolitics, and not using strategy. Nowadays it is changing, but still, some people are fascinated by the notion of hybrid warfare, which leads to the ... very "interesting" scenarios, which actually are only good for winding popular paranoia (for example about Belorussian use of demographic weapon against Poland, despite even proponents of such ideas admitting that there are no real signs, which in turn is always implied that it is sign of expertly conducted operation).